Opportunities in society are commonly interpreted as 'chances of success'. Within this interpretation, should opportunities be equalised? We show that a liberal principle of justice and a limited principle of social rationality imply that opportunity pro…les should be evaluated by means of a 'Nash' criterion. The interpretation is new: the social objective should be to maximise the chance that everybody in society succeeds. In particular, the failure of even only one individual must be considered maximally detrimental. We also study a re…nement of this criterion and its extension to problems of intergenerational justice.
Introduction
'Opportunities' have become a central concept both in the public discourse and in economics. To model opportunities, we assume that each individual is regarded as a binary experiment with either 'success' or 'failure' as possible outcomes. Then, opportunities in society are expressed by the pro…le of 'chances of success' across individuals. By means of this simpli…cation, we are able to o¤er several insights on the issue of the allocation of opportunities.
For example, what is the social cost of one person in society not having any chance of success? Is it conceivable that such a sacri…ce be justi…ed by a su¢cient increase in opportunities for the rest of society? In general, we provide a theoretical framework to answer this type of question.
When in a social policy study it is claimed that some categories of individuals have low opportunities, what is usually meant is that the probabilities -measured through empirical frequencies -of those individuals to attain success in a certain dimension are lower than some benchmark. So it is quite common to read statements of this kind: "An adolescent of ethnic origin X and social background Y has half the average chances to be eventually admitted into a top university". Statements such as this link some attribute of individuals in a group to the attainment of a desirable target simply by looking at the objective statistical frequencies of attainment for that group. 2 On this interpretation there is no mention of 'e¤ort', 'responsibility' or 'talent' (the implicit assumption being, obviously, that they are distributed in a similar way across the relevant groups). And politicians express themselves openly in terms of chances. For example, beside the opening quote from Tony Blair, in a recent major independent report [12] , Labour MP Frank Field says that "improving the life chances of under …ves is the key to cutting social inequality". On the contrary, economists have tended in the main to adopt more sophisticated and indirect views of the concept of opportunity. Talent and responsibility are placed at the forefront. 3 It is also often taken as given that opportunities, once properly formulated, should be equalised.
We take seriously the direct interpretation of practical decision makers. In spite of its limitations, this approach has the advantage of interpreting opportunities in a way that is very amenable to straightforward measurement. A target for social policy to equalise the proportion of students in top schools among the various ethnic groups, or the proportion in high-level jobs of students from di¤erent types of schools, is concrete and easy to understand and verify empirically, in a way in which, say, 'equalise capabilities across ethnic groups' is not. 4 Our drastic simpli…cation yields some interesting insights in respect of a di¢culty with justifying egalitarian principles. Equalisation of any value measure across individuals might always be criticised (just like simple welfare egalitarianism) on the grounds that many individuals might have to face large aggregate losses for the sake of increasing only marginally the value for one individual. Our analysis, however, leads to a preference for some degree of equality that does not stem from the nature of the 'equalisandum' (opportunities as opposed to welfare), but rather from outside the stock of egalitarian principles, via a liberal principle of non-interference. The details of this principle are explained in section 4, but its core is the requirement that each individual in society should enjoy full control on her opportunities when this does not a¤ect in any way the opportunities of other agents.
By means of this and other properties we characterise some 'Nash-like' criteria: society should, broadly speaking, maximise the product of opportunities. In the usual setting of social welfare, a drawback of the Nash product 3 The literature here is vast too: an illustrative but far from comprehensive selection of contributions includes: Sen [35] ; Fleurbaey [13] , [14] ; Herrero [18] ; Bossert and Fleurbaey [8] ; Kranich [20] ; Roemer [32] , [33] ; Laslier et al. [21] ; Tungodden [37] .
The contribution by Bénabou and Ok [5] does not refer to responsibility and is in this respect closer in spirit to this paper. However, our focus is di¤erent since we attempt to derive the desiderability of equality from …rst principles.
is that it raises a di¢culty of interpretation: what does a product of utilities mean? In contrast, classical criteria such as the Utilitarian and maximin ones, for example, are clearly interpretable. 5 However, in the context of this paper the Nash product, too, acquires a transparent meaning: under the assumption that the individuals are independent experiments, to maximise the Nash product means to maximise the probability that everybody in society succeeds. 6 An interesting feature of the Nash criterion in a context of opportunity pro…les is an extremely egalitarian implication. In fact, it is su¢cient for a pro…le to include one agent who fails with certainty for this pro…le to be the worst possible one (no matter how many other individuals succeed). This answers the question of the opening paragraph.
However, this straightforward application of the Nash criterion comes at the cost of large indi¤erence classes: we cannot distinguish situations where all individuals fail from situations in which only one of them fails (only weak, and not strong, Pareto optimality is satis…ed on the set of pro…les in which some of the individuals fail). So we also formulate a new variant of the Nash criterion, the Two-Step Nash criterion. This criterion re…nes the indi¤erence classes and satis…es strong Pareto optimality. Nevertheless, even this variant has a cost (from an egalitarian perspective), namely mitigating the strong form of inequality aversion at the boundary shown by the standard Nash.
Finally, we also study situations where the number of agents is in…nite. This case is relevant for the evaluation of intergenerational allocation problems. A concrete example of 'success' for a generation would be for example the ability to enjoy a clean environment. At a more abstract level, in an "Aristotelian" perspective, self-realisation -intended as developing human capacities -could be taken as the fundamental objective of mankind. In this interpretation, the probability of success of a generation is the probability that the generation will develop its inherently human capacities. At the formal level, the main novelty in this part of the paper is the introduction of the Nash catching up and the Nash overtaking criteria. This part of the analysis complements a voluminous stream of recent work (including Alcantud [1] , Asheim and Banerjee [3] , Basu and Mitra [4] , Bossert et al. [9] . For a detailed survey, see Asheim [2] ), and is necessarily more technical in nature.
The framework
There are T individuals in society. An opportunity for individual t is a number between 0 and 1. This number is interpreted as a 'chance of success' either in some given …eld or in life as a whole, 7 so that opportunities can be manipulated just as probabilities. We are interested in how opportunities should be allocated among the T individuals. The underlying idea is that some (limited) resources (possibly money) can be allocated so as to in ‡uence the distribution of opportunities. 8 An opportunity pro…le (or simply a pro…le) is a point in the 'box of life' B T = [0; 1] T , where T is either a natural number T or 1, interpreted as the cardinalities of a …nite set of agents N or of an in…nite set of agents N, respectively. So, in the latter case, B 1 denotes the set of countably in…nite streams of probabilities of success for agents in N. Here we develop the notation for the …nite case.
A pro…le a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a T ) 2 B T lists the opportunities, or 'chances of success' of agents in N if a is chosen.
The points 0 = (0; 0; :::; 0) 2 B T and 1 = (1; 1; :::; 1) 2 B T can be thought of as Hell (no opportunities for anybody) and Heaven (full opportunities for everybody), respectively. We will also say that individual t is in Hell (resp., Heaven) at a if a t = 0 (resp., a t = 1).
Let B T + = a 2 B T ja 0 . 9 A permutation is a bijective mapping of N onto itself. For all a 2 B T , let a be the permutation of a which ranks its elements in ascending order (well-de…ned since T is …nite). 7 Leading examples of 'success' that appear in the social policy literature are the following: no teenage childbearing; not dropping out of school; attainment of x years of formal education; attainment of fraction of the average hourly wage, or yearly income; no male idleness (this is de…ned in Mayer [27] as the condition of a 24-year old not in school and not having done paid work during the previous year); no single motherhood. In a health context, success may be de…ned, for instance, by: surviving until age y; surviving a given operation; (for a group) mortality and morbidity below percentage of a reference group's average. In a social psychology context, success may be related to reported happiness being within a certain quantile of the population. And so on. 8 See Mayer [27] for an interesting counterpoint to the e¤ect of money on children's life chances. 9 Vector notation: for all a; b 2 B T we write a b to mean a t b t , for all t 2 N ; a > b to mean a b and a 6 = b; and a b to mean a t > b t , for all t 2 N .
Opportunities in the box of life: …nite societies
We aim to specify desirable properties for a social opportunity relation < S on the box of life B T . 10 Two properties for < S are the following, for all a; b 2 B T :
Strong Pareto Optimality: a > b ) a S b:
These properties are standard and will not be discussed further. For future reference, we de…ne some possible relations on the box of life. 11 For all a; b 2 B T , the Nash social opportunity ordering < N aggregates chances of success by multiplication:
The Two-Step Nash social opportunity ordering < 2N provides a re…nement of the Nash ordering on the boundary of the box of life. For all a 2 B T , let P a = ft 2 N : a t > 0g. Then for all a; b 2 B T :
Thus also:
10 Given a binary relation < on a set X and x; y 2 X, we write x y (the asymmetric factor) if and only if x < y and y 6 < x, and we write x s y (the symmetric part) if and only if x < y and y < x. 11 We recall here some standard terminology. A relation < on a set X is said to be: re ‡exive if, for any x 2 X, x < x; complete if, for any x; y 2 X, x 6 = y implies x < y or y < x; transitive if, for any x; y; z 2 X, x < y < z implies x < z. < is a quasi-ordering if it is re ‡exive and transitive, while < is an ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering. A relation < 0 on X is an extension of < if 0 and 0 .
6 which includes the case jP a j = jP b j = 0 and a = b = 0. 12 So, the Two-Step Nash ordering is equivalent to the standard Nash ordering in the interior of the box of life (that is, in the case jP a j = jP b j = T ), but unlike the standard Nash ordering it does not consider all pro…les on the boundary indi¤erent. If at least one of the two pro…les has (at least) a zero component we count the positive entries. If they have the same number of positive entries, we apply Nash to them. If not, then the pro…le with the higher number of positive entries is preferred.
A Non-Interference Principle
Imagine that success is achieved by overcoming a series of independent 'hurdles'. For example, for success in becoming a doctor, being a dustman's daughter combines hurdles that a doctor's son does not face (less favourable studying environment, lack of a high-level social network, and so on). The addition or removal of hurdles has a multiplicative e¤ect on the probability of success. With this interpretation in mind, the next axiom imposes some minimal limits on the interference of society on an individual's opportunities. We assume that an individual has the right to prevent society from acting against her in all circumstances of change in her opportunities (due to a change in the hurdles she faces), provided that the opportunities of no other individual are a¤ected. By 'acting against her' we mean a switch against the individual in society's strict rankings of the chance pro…les, with respect to the ranking of the original pro…les (before the change in hurdles for the individual under consideration occurred). Crucially, the principle says nothing on society's possible actions aimed at increasing the individual's opportunities: for example, an individual facing additional hurdles cannot demand (on the basis of our axiom) to be compensated by a switch of society's ranking in her favour. In this sense the principle we propose is libertarian rather than egalitarian. 13 Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let a; b; a 0 ; b 0 2 B T be such that 12 We use the convention that Q t2P a a t = Q t2P b b t = 1 when P a = P b = ?. 13 In Mariotti and Veneziani [24] , we explore a more radical formalisation of the principle, applied not to chances but to welfare levels, in which the 'no harm' conclusion follows even when the reduction in welfare is not proportional. This leads to the leximin principle.
From a philosophical viewpoint, we interpret this principle as an incarnation of J.S. Mill's 'Harm Principle'. We dwell on philosophical issues in Veneziani and Mariotti [38] . a S b and, for some t 2 N and for some > 0,
Then b 0 S a 0 whenever a 0 t > b 0 t . In other words, when comparing for example two pairs of pro…les interpreted as involving losses of opportunities for only individual t from an initial situation a; b to a …nal situation a 0 ; b 0 as described, there are three possibilities:
Individual t is compensated for her loss (society abandons the strict preference for t's lower-chances pro…le).
Individual t is not harmed further beyond the given opportunity damage (society prefers always the lower-chances or always the higherchances pro…le for t).
Individual t is punished (society switches preference from t's higher chances pro…le to t's lower chances-pro…le).
What Probabilistic Non-Interference does is to exclude the third possibility. Society's choice should not become less favourable to somebody solely because her position has worsened, without a¤ecting others' opportunities. And a symmetric argument can be made for comparisons of two pairs of pro…les involving increases in opportunities only for individual t. 14 Note how in formulating this principle the cause of the reduction or increase in opportunities for individual t (i.e. the speci…c hurdles that are raised or removed) is completely ignored. It may have happened because of carelessness or because of sheer good or bad luck. All that matters is that the other individuals are not a¤ected by individual t's change.
At the formal level, note that we allow for the possibility that b t = b 0 t = 0. Below we also explore a version of the axiom in which we require b t > 0. This is important from both the theoretical and the analytical viewpoint. Theoretically, the question is whether the principle should be restricted to situations where a damage occurs in the strict sense, i.e. where probabilities strictly decrease. This may seem reasonable, but maybe it is not. If b t = 0, so that an agent is already in Hell, then one may argue that the logic of Probabilistic Non-Interference would suggest that changing social preferences to b 0 S a 0 is a very heavy punishment indeed.
Note also the conclusion b 0 S a 0 in the statement of the axiom. The veto power of the individual whose opportunities have changed is limited, in that she cannot impose on society a ranking in complete agreement with her chances. This feature becomes especially relevant if we allow < S to be incomplete (as in the impossibility results below), for in this case b 0 S a 0 does not imply a 0 < S b 0 and thus the requirement of the axiom becomes even weaker.
While its conceptual motivation is di¤erent, at the formal level Probabilistic Non-Interference is obviously reminiscent of the standard ratio-scale invariance property that has been used to axiomatize the Nash social welfare ordering (we discuss the relevant literature in section 9). We stress, however, the crucial fact that Probabilistic Non-Interference does not map strict social preferences to strict social peferences, and allows a social indi¤erence (or noncomparability) to follow from a strict social preference after a ratio-scale type of transformation. The full force of this distinction will be evident, for example, in Lemma 4 below, in which the it will be shown that Probabilistic Non-Interference implies ratio scale invariance only in conjunction with a 'social rationality' type of axiom.
Probabilistic Non-Interference rules out, for instance, the Utilitarian ordering. The following example demonstrates this and provides an illustration of how the principle works: 15 Example 1 Utilitarianism violates Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let N = f1; 2g. Then 1; 1 8 is Utilitarian-better than 1 2 ; 1 2 but 1 2 ; 1 8 is Utilitarian-worse than 1 4 ; 1 2 . Yet in moving from 1; 1 8 to 1 2 ; 1 8 , and from 1 2 ; 1 2 to 1 4 ; 1 2 , all that has happened is that individual 1's opportunities have been halved, without touching the opportunities of the other individual. The switch in social choice punishes individual 1 for the damage she has su¤ered!
Impossibilities
When attempting to apply Probabilistic Non-Interference -together with the other basic requirements of Anonymity and Strong Pareto Optimality -we are immediately confronted with a di¢culty.
Theorem 2 There exists no transitive social opportunity relation < S on B T that satis…es Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, and Probabilistic Non-Interference. x; x; :::; x) where a 0 1 = a 1 , b 0 1 = b 1 = 0, for some 2 (0; 1) such that a 1 < b 2 . Since a 1 > b 1 , then by Probabilistic Non-Interference, it follows that b 0 S a 0 . However, by transitivity, together with Anonymity and Strong Pareto Optimality, b 0 S a 0 , a contradiction.
Observe that this result holds for social opportunity relations which are possibly incomplete. And even transitivity can be dispensed with, provided that Anonymity and Pareto Optimality are replaced by the following axiom.
Suppes-Sen Grading Principle:
If a > b for some permutation then a S b.
Corollary 3 There exists no social opportunity relation < S on B T that satis-…es Suppes-Sen Grading Principle and Probabilistic Non-Interference.
Proof: Straightforward modi…cation of the previous proof.
Previous impossibility results concerning the application of the Nash criterion (in the context of welfare orderings) focus on the role of continuity axioms (instead of impartiality ones such as Anonymity or the Suppes-Sen Grading Principle). For example, Tsui and Weymark's [36] Theorem 1 states that there exists no social welfare ordering on R n , or on R n + , which satis…es a continuity axiom, Strong Pareto Optimality, and the standard ratio-scale measurability axiom. A further di¤erence concerns the fact that, as noted, we dispense with both the completeness and the transitivity of < S . And, thirdly, Probabilistic Non-Interference is strictly weaker than ratio-scale measurability, given that the consequent in the statement of the axiom only requires that society's strict preference should not be reversed (which in our case allows both for indi¤erence or noncomparability). It is also easy to con…rm that a weaker version of Probabilistic Non-Interference, with the restriction 2 (0; 1) (i.e. only 'opportunity damage' is considered), would su¢ce for the results.
An equivalent of Theorem 2 holds also for in…nite societies using Finite Anonymity (de…ned in section 10) and the in…nite version of Probabilistic Non-Interference below.
The result originates in the structure of the space of alternatives and the properties of the boundary of the box of life, coupled with the fact that Probabilistic Non-Interference applies also to pro…les on the boundary, and to boundary values b t = 0. In this sense, while the impossibility is robust, in the sense that it holds for several combinations of similar axioms (e.g. Strong Pareto Optimality in the statement could be weakened in some ways without eliminating the result) it does not appear to uncover any deep contradiction between normative principles.
We shall explore two possible strategies to avoid the impossibility and thus two alternative ways of weakening the above axioms. The …rst strategy consists of weakening Strong Pareto Optimality. For all a; b 2 B T :
In order to derive our main characterisation, we need to introduce another property.
Social Rationality and the Diamond Critique
The new type of property we examine concerns the 'rationality' of the social opportunity relation. Consider …rst an axiom analogous to the sure-thing type of principle underlying Harsanyi's [17] defense of Utilitarianism (in a welfare context):
Sure Thing is a classical independence property, and it can be justi…ed in a standard way as follows. Denote the compound pro…les a 00 = a+(1 ) a 0 and b 00 = b + (1 ) b 0 . The pro…le a 00 can be thought of as being obtained by means of a two-stage lottery: …rst, an event E can occur with probability . Then, if E occurs the pro…le is a, and otherwise it is a 0 . And b 00 can be described analogously, as a compound event conditional on the occurrence or not of E. Then, when choosing between a 00 and b 00 , it seems natural to adhere to this decomposition: if E occurs, it would have been better to choose a 00 since a is better than b; and if E does not occur it would also have been better to choose a 00 since a 0 is better than b 0 . Therefore, a 00 should be regarded as better than b 00 before knowing whether E occurs or not.
We think that a property akin to Sure Thing should be imposed but that, as it is formulated, it displays some ethically unattractive features. The following argument parallels the classical 'Diamond critique' of the similar property in Harsanyi's Utilitarianism 16 (note that a utilitarian social opportunity ordering would satisfy Sure Thing). Consider:
Then if Anonymity applies we have
16 See also Fleurbaey [15] . and by Sure Thing
But having one individual in Hell and the other in Heaven for sure can hardly be reasonably regarded as socially indi¤erent to both individuals being half way between Heaven and Hell in the box of life. As Diamond [11] would put it, "b 00 seems strictly preferable to me since it gives 1 a fair share while a 00 does not". 17 The reason for this unacceptable situation is, obviously, that 'mixing' opportunities across di¤erent individuals may produce ethically relevant e¤ects. The problem of properties like Sure Thing, both in a utility context and in the present one, is precisely the potentially bene…cial e¤ect of this sort of 'diagonal mixing' in the box of life.
However, the property is immune from this line of criticism when the allowable mixings are restricted to ones that are parallel to the edges of the box: namely, the compound lotteries only concern one single individual. This seems to capture a position à la Diamond: "I am willing to accept the sure-thing principle for individual choice but not for social choice" ( [11] , p. 766).
The following weakening of Sure Thing is then responsive to the Diamond critique:
Individual Sure Thing: Let a; b 2 B T be such that a < S b and let a 0 ; b 0 2 B T be such that there exists t 2 N such that a 0 j = a j and b 0 j = b j , for all j 2 N nftg, and a 0 < S b 0 . Then
if at least one of the two preferences in the premise is strict. a conceptual level, as it helps clarify the distinction between a ratio-scale invariance property and Probabilistic Non-Interference. The latter implies the former (and is otherwise weaker) only with the addition of 'social rationality' in the form of Individual Sure Thing:
Lemma 4 Let the social opportunity ordering < S on B T satisfy Probabilistic Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing. Let a; b; a 0 ; b 0 2 B T be such that a S b and, for some t 2 N and some > 0,
The proofs of all Lemmas are in the Appendix. The next Lemma proves that any two pro…les that imply Hell for at least one individual are socially indi¤erent (we address this feature in the next section).
Lemma 5 Let the social opportunity ordering < S on B T satisfy Anonymity, Probabilistic Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing. Then:
Finally, the next result proves that the standard monotonicity property is implied by the four main axioms above. Given the previous lemmas, we can now show that an ordering in the box of life can be completely characterised by the four axioms discussed before. 18 Theorem 7 (MAXIMISE THE PROBABILITY OF HEAVEN): A social opportunity ordering < S on B T satis…es Anonymity, Weak Pareto Optimality, Probabilistic Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing if and only if < S is the Nash ordering < N .
Proof: ()) It is immediate to prove that the Nash ordering < N satis…es all four axioms.
(() Suppose that the social opportunity ordering < S on B T satis…es Anonymity, Weak Pareto Optimality, Probabilistic Non-Interference, and Individual Sure Thing. For any a; b 2 B T , we shall prove that (i)
then lemma 5 implies that b S 0, and by Weak Pareto Optimality and transitivity, we obtain a S b.
Therefore, suppose b 2 B T + . Note that by Anonymity, we can work with the ranked vectors a; b. Therefore suppose, by contradiction, that a Since b S a, by Lemma 6 it must be L 6 = ;. Let h = min t2L t and let d = max t2L t. We consider the following cases.
there is at least one t 2 U; t < T , and by construction b T > a T a t > b t . By Anonymity and transitivity, consider a vector a which is a permutation of a such that a T = a t . Then, from a ; b construct a 0 ; b 0 as follows:
and leave all other entries of a and b unchanged.
Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b 0 S a 0 . However, a 0 > b 0 , and therefore by Lemma 6, Anonymity, and transitivity, it follows
Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b 0 S a 0 . Note that by 
Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b 0 S a 0 . However, a 0 > b 0 , and therefore by Lemma 6, Anonymity, and transitivity, it follows that a 0 < S b 0 , a contradiction. If at bt b 1 a 1 , let = at bt " and " > 0 is chosen so that > 1. By
Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b 0 S a 0 . Note that by construction b 0 This
Then there exists a su¢ciently small number " > 0 such that a " = (a 1 "; a 2 "; :::; a T ") 2 B T , Q T t=1 (a t ") > Q T t=1 b t , and so a " N b, but by Weak Pareto Optimality and transitivity, b S a " . Then the previous argument can be applied to a " and b.
, then the result follows from re ‡exivity. If Q T t=1 a t = Q T t=1 b t = 0, then the result follows from Lemma 5. Therefore suppose that 1 > Q T t=1 a t = Q T t=1 b t > 0. If there exists a permutation such that a = b, then the result follows by Anonymity. Therefore, suppose that U = t 2 N j a t > b t 6 = ; and L = t 2 N j b t > a t 6 = ;. Suppose in contradiction that a S b. By completeness, and without loss of generality, suppose that a S b. By Anonymity and transitivity, consider the ranked vectors a; b.
Let k = min t2U t. Take any l 2 L. Suppose that l < k.
[An analogous argument applies if l > k.] By construction a k > b k b l > a l . By Anonymity and transitivity, consider a vector b which is a permutation of b such that b k = b l . Then, from a; b construct a 0 ; b 0 as follows. Let a 1 a 0 ; and b 1 b 0 : by construction
o . If U = fkg and L = flg, it is easy to show that E 1 = N , yielding the desired contradiction, by transitivity and Anonymity. Otherwise, the previous argument can be iterated m 1 times to obtain vectors a m ; b m 2 B T such that a m S b m , but E m = N , which again yields a contradiction by transitivity and Anonymity.
The interpretation of the Nash social opportunity ordering is of interest. In the present framework, each individual is a binary experiment, with outcome either success or failure. Imagining that such experiments are independent, the ordering just characterised says that chances in life should be allocated in such a way as to maximise the probability that everybody succeeds. As a particular implication, the failure of even only one individual must be considered as maximally detrimental.
Contrast this attempt to maximise the probability of Heaven with a Utilitarian type of ordering, which would maximise the sum of probabilities. In the proposed interpretation, that would amount to maximising the expected number of successes. Clearly, such a method would be biased, compared to the one proposed, against a minority of individuals with very low probability of success.
It is also interesting to compare the use of the Nash ordering in the present framework to that in a standard utility framework. In the latter, there are two problems of interpretation.
Firstly, it is not clear what it means to maximise a product of utilities (as noted, e.g., by Rubinstein [34] 19 ). In a welfare world the utilitarian process of aggregation has a 'natural' meaning, which the Nash product lacks. But in a world of chances, a process of aggregation by product feels equally natural.
Secondly, the maximisation of the Nash product on the positive orthant requires the external speci…cation of a 'welfare zero'. In a bargaining context, this is assumed to be the 'disagreement point'; but its determination in a general social choice context is unclear, and it must be based on some external argument. On the contrary, the structure of the box of life, with its internal zero, makes this problem vanish. 19 "The formula of the Nash bargaining solution lacks a clear meaning. What is the interpretation of the product of two von Neumann Morgenstern utility numbers?" (p. 82). The interpretation he goes on to propose is related to non-cooperative bargaining. Here we are rather interested in an interpretation of the Nash ordering as an ethical allocation method. A di¤erent interpretation in this vein is in Mariotti [23] .
The Two-Step Nash Ordering
A drawback of the Nash ordering -a consequence of relaxing Strong Pareto Optimality -is that it yields some very large indi¤erence classes by considering all points on the boundary of the box of life as equally good (or bad). This may be deemed undesirable from an ethical perspective, and it may be a drawback for practical applications. For a pro…le where all agents (potentially a very large number of individuals) are in Hell can hardly be seen as indi¤erent to one in which only one of them su¤ers.
In this section, we explore another way out of the impossibility in which Strong Pareto Optimality is not abandoned. This requires some adjustments in the axiomatic system. We restrict the application of Probabilistic Non-Interference to strictly positive probabilities (as we discussed after the definition of the principle, this may be a reasonable restriction), and we also make strict the conclusion in the statement of the axiom.
Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference : Let a; b; a 0 ; b 0 2 B T be such that a S b and, for some t 2 N and for some > 0,
j for all j 6 = t; b j = b 0 j for all j 6 = t:
Then a 0 S b 0 whenever b t 6 = 0 and a 0 t > b 0 t . We can now state the main characterisation of this section: Claim (i). We need to consider three cases. Suppose that a; b 2 B T + are such that
Then the same reasoning as in theorem 7 can be applied to rule out b S a, noting that in the interior of the box of life, Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference is stronger than Probabilistic Non-Interference.
Suppose that a; b 2 B T are such that jP a j = jP b j < T and Q t2P a a t > Q t2P b b t : Then by focusing on the subset of strictly positive entries of a; b 2 B T , the previous reasoning can be used to rule out b S a.
Suppose that a; b 2 B T are such that jP a j > jP b j. By Anonymity and transitivity, consider the ranked vectors a; b. Let k = min ft 2 N : a t > 0g. Note that by assumption, a k > b k = 0. Next, let l = min t 2 N : b t > 0 . If for all i l, a i b i , then the result follows by Strong Pareto Optimality. Therefore suppose that b h > a h , some h l, and, in contradiction to claim (i), b S a. Then by Anonymity and transitivity, consider vector b which is a permutation of b such that b k = b h . Then, from a; b construct a 0 ; b 0 as follows: let > 0 be such that a 0
Since h l > k, then b 0 k > a 0 k , and given that a 0 k 6 = 0, by Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference, it follows that b 0 S a 0 . Consider the ranked vectors a 0 ; b 0 . Note that k 0 = min ft 2 N : a 0 t > 0g = k. If a 0 > b 0 , then the desired contradiction follows from Strong Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and transitivity. Otherwise repeat the procedure (always using the k-th entry of the ranked vectors a, a 0 , and so on) until the desired contradiction ensues. The previous arguments prove that a 2N b implies a < S b. Suppose, contrary to claim (i), that a S b. Then, for a su¢ciently small " > 0, it is possible to construct a pro…le a " 2 B T such that a " t = a t " > 0 for some t 2 N , a " j = a j all j 6 = t, and a " 2N b. By transitivity and Strong Pareto Optimality, b S a " , and the previous arguments can be applied.
Claim (ii). We need to consider two cases.
The result follows from a suitable modi…cation of the proof of theorem 7 above, noting that Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference is stronger than Probabilistic Non-Interference for pro…les in the interior of the box of life.
Suppose that jP a j = jP b j < T and Q t2P a a t = Q t2P b b t . If jP a j = jP b j > 0, then by focusing on the strictly positive entries of a; b 2 B T , the same reasoning as for the case of a; b 2 B T + such that Q T t=1 a t = Q T t=1 b t can be applied to obtain the desired contradiction. If jP a j = jP b j = 0, then a S b by re ‡exivity.
As the reader will have noticed, a major di¤erence between theorems 7 and 8 is the absence of Individual Sure Thing in the latter. In fact, the twostep Nash ordering does not satisfy Individual Sure Thing, as the following example demonstrates:
Example 9 a = ( 3 10 ; 4 10 ) 2N b = ( 2 10 ; 6 10 ) and a 0 = ( 3 10 ; 0) 2N b 0 = ( 2 10 ; 0). However,
In fact, 8 2 (0; 1) a = ( 3 10 ; 4 10 ) and b = ( 2 10 ; 6 10 ), and thus
This example implies immediately, together with the characterisation, that it is impossible to impose on a social opportunity ordering < S the four properties of Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference, and Individual Sure Thing. The next result provides a direct proof of this claim, and it demonstrates that the clash between axioms remains even if one drops transitivity. By Strong Pareto Optimality we have a 0 S b 0 . Now consider two possibilities.
If a < S b then by Individual Sure Thing again contradicting Anonymity.
Finally, we note the following related result (communicated to us by J.C.R. Alcantud) which further clari…es the frontier between possibility and impossibility:
Theorem 11 There exists no re ‡exive and transitive (not necessarily complete) social opportunity relation < S on B T that satis…es Anonymity, Probabilistic Non-Interference, Individual Sure Thing and the following minimal mononicity property: there exists x > 0 for which (x; 0; 0; :::) S (0; 0; 0; :::).
(The proof is available upon request).
Relation with the literature
To reiterate, the main goal of this paper is to study an operational version of opportunities and to illustrate a new interpretation of the Nash criterion in this context. Nevertheless, in this section we collect for the interested reader some observations on the formal relation between our work and the literature on the Nash social welfare orderings (SWOs).
The older part of this literature focuses on the strictly positive orthant only (Boadway and Bruce [6] ; Moulin [28] . See also Bosi, Candeal and Indurain [7] ) and as we have seen pro…les with zero entries create special technical problems. While still using a di¤erent domain (that of the box of life) our setting is closer to two more recent contributions by Tsui and Weymark [36] and Naumova and Yanovskaya [29] , who explore larger domains. Apart from the deep di¤erence in interpretation, the main technical di¤erence from those papers is that we focus on Anonymity and in this way we do not assume any continuity property, whereas continuity axioms are central in both of those contributions. Consequently, the arguments involved are entirely di¤erent. Notably, we do not use any results from functional analysis, nor properties of social welfare functions, since we cannot assume that our social welfare ordering is representable.
To be more speci…c, Tsui and Weymark ([36] , Theorem 5, p.252) elegantly characterise, using techniques from functional analysis, 'Cobb-Douglas' SWOs (of which the Nash ordering is a special case) on R n by a continuity axiom, Weak Pareto Optimality and Ratio Scale measurability. Once transferred to the appropriate domain, our ranking can be seen as the anonymous case within this class (obtained via Anonymity instead of continuity). [36] do not characterise SWOs similar to our Two-Step Nash ordering. Naumova and Yanovskaya [29] provide a general analysis of SWOs on R n that satisfy Ratio-Scale measurability, and they do characterise some lexicographic social welfare functions. Essentially, as compared to [36] , they weaken the continuity properties. For example, they focus on the requirement that continuity should hold within orthants, which are unbounded sets of vectors whose individual components have always the same sign, positive, negative or zero (therefore the vectors (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), and (0; 1; 1), for instance, belong to the box of life B 3 but to three di¤erent orthants in the sense of [29] ). The lexicographic SWOs characterised there di¤er markedly from ours in that they require a linear ordering of the orthants and therefore vectors on the boundary of the box of life (e.g., (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), and (0; 1; 1) in B 3 ) will never be indi¤erent. Therefore, contrary to our analysis, Anonymity is violated.
In…nite societies: Nash overtaking and catching up
The focus on joint probability of success seems, at the conceptual level, as attractive an opportunity criterion when the agents are in…nite in number as when there is only a …nite number of them. And yet, a large set of in…nite streams of probabilities yield a zero probability of joint success, making the criterion vacuous for practical purposes. We propose two solutions to this dilemma, which consist of adapting two well-known methods for comparing in…nite streams of utilities: namely, the overtaking and the catching-up criteria. In order to obtain the desired extensions of the social opportunity relations, we simply add properties that permit a link with the in…nite case to (analogs of) the characterising axioms of the …nite case. In this way, we obtain an overtaking version of the Nash criterion and a catching-up version of the Two-Step Nash criterion.
Almost without exception all uses of the Nash criterion we are aware of apply to a …nite number of agents, and therefore our proposals may be of independent interest. 20 The previous notation is extended in a straightforward way to the in…nite context, with the following speci…c additions. A pro…le is now denoted 1 a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::) 2 B 1 , where a t is the probability of success of generation t 2 N. For T 2 N, 1 a T = (a 1 ; :::; a T ) denotes the T -head of 1 a and T +1 a = (a T +1 ; a T +2 ; :::) denotes its T -tail, so that 1 a = ( 1 a T ; T +1 a).
For any x 2 B, x = (x; x; :::) 2 B 1 denotes the stream of constant probabilities equal to x. Let B 1 + = f 1 a 2 B 1 j 1 a 0g. For all 1 a 2 B 1 and T 2 N, let P 1 a T = ft 2 f1; :::; T g : a t > 0g.
A permutation is now a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A permutation of N is …nite if there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, for all t > T , and is the set of all …nite permutations of N. For any 1 a 2 B 1 and any 2 , let ( 1 a) = a (t) t2N be a permutation of 1 a. For any 1 a 2 B 1 , let 1 a T denote the permutation of the T -head of 1 a, which ranks the elements of 1 a T in ascending order.
We are now reasy to consider the …rst in…nite horizon version of the Nash criterion.
The Nash overtaking criterion: For all 1 a;
The characterisation results below are based on the following axioms which are analogous to those used in the …nite context. Probabilistic Non-Interference : Let 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 be such that 1 a = ( 1 a T ; T +1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1 a S 1 b; and let 1 a 0 ; 1 b 0 2 B 1 be such that for some t 2 N, and some > 0,
for all j 6 = t:
Individual Sure Thing : Let 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 be such that 1 a = ( 1 a T ; T +1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1 a < S 1 b and let 1 a 0 ; 1 b 0 2 B 1 be such that for some t T , a 0 j = a j and b 0 j = b j , for all j 6 = t, and 1 a 0 < S 1 b 0 . Then
if at least one of the two preferences in the premise is strict.
Like in the …nite case, Strong Pareto Optimality must necessarily be weakened to avoid impossibilities: Monotonicity and Restricted Dominance are two such weakenings that have been used in the literature (for a discussion, see Asheim [2] ).
In addition to the above axioms, a weak consistency requirement is imposed.
Weak Consistency: For all 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 : (i) 9T 2 N :
. Weak Consistency provides a link to the …nite setting by transforming the comparison of two in…nite utility paths into an in…nite number of comparisons of utility paths each containing a …nite number of generations. Axioms similar to Weak Consistency are common in the literature (see, e.g., Basu and Mitra [4] , Asheim [2] , Asheim and Banerjee [3] ). 21 Finally, the next axiom requires that < S be complete at least when comparing elements of B 1 with the same tail. This requirement is weak and it seems uncontroversial, for it is obviously desirable to be able to rank as many vectors as possible. 22 Minimal Completeness: For all 1 a;
Before proving our main characterisation result, we state without proof the following Lemmas which extend to B 1 the equivalent results obtained in the …nite context. 23 Lemma 12 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering < S on B 1 satisfy Probabilistic Non-Interference , Individual Sure Thing , and Minimal Completeness. Let 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 be such that 1 a = ( 1 a T ; T +1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1 a S 1 b; and let 1 a 0 ; 1 b 0 2 B 1 be such that for some t 2 N, and for some > 0, a 0 t = a t ; b 0 t = b t ; a 0 j = a j all j 6 = t; b 0 j = b j all j 6 = t: Then:
Lemma 13 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering < S on B 1 satisfy Finite Anonymity, Probabilistic Non-Interference , Individual Sure Thing , and Minimal Completeness. Then: for all 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 such that T +1 a = T +1 b for some T 2 N, [a t = 0; b j = 0; some t; j 2 f1; :::; T g] )
Further, the next Lemma derives a useful implication of Monotonicity, Restricted Dominance, and Individual Sure Thing . Lemma 14 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering < S on B 1 satisfy Monotonicity, Restricted Dominance, and Individual Sure Thing . Then: for all
The next Theorem proves that the above axioms jointly characterise the Nash overtaking quasi-ordering. 22 Lombardi and Veneziani [22] use minimal completeness to characterise the in…nite leximin and maximin social welfare relations. 23 The proofs of Lemmas 12 and 13 are straightforward modi…cations of the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, respectively, and therefore they are omitted. Details are available from the authors upon request. The proofs of the two theorems of this section are in the Appendix. Next, we provide an extension of the Two-Step Nash criterion to the in…nite context in the framework of Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [9] . As announced, the characterisation is based on in…nite-versions of the axioms used in Section 8. In addition to Finite Anonymity, we consider Strong Pareto Optimality: For all 1 a;
. Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference : Let 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 be such that 1 a = ( 1 a T ; T +1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1 a S 1 b; and let 1 a 0 ; 1 b 0 2 B 1 be such that for some t 2 N and some > 0,
Then 1 a 0 S 1 b 0 whenever b t 6 = 0 and a 0 t > b 0 t . Suppose that for each T 2 N, the Two-Step Nash ordering on B T is denoted as < 2N F . In analogy with Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [9] , the Two-Step Nash social opportunity relation on B 1 can be formulated as follows. De…ne < 2N T B 1 B 1 by letting, for all 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 ,
The relation < 2N T is re ‡exive and transitive for all T 2 N. Then the Two-Step Nash social opportunity relation is 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed formulating opportunities as chances of success, an interpretation close to the standard use of the term by practitioners. This interpretation is easily amenable to concrete measurement, suitable to the formulation of social policy targets, and close to common usage in the public debate.
We have highlighted some interesting con ‡icts between principles and discussed how such con ‡icts can be overcome. We have shown that strong limits to inequality in the pro…le of opportunities are implied by a liberal principle of justice and of social rationality. Beside the inequality aversion (concavity) of the social criterion, even only one person failing with certainty brings down the value of any pro…le to the minimum possible.
The use of the Nash social opportunity ordering acquires a natural interpretation in this context as the probability that everybody succeeds. Although not purely egalitarian, this 'maximise the probability of Heaven' criterion is likely in practice to avoid major disparities in opportunities, as pro…les involving very low opportunities for one individual will appear very low in the social ordering. And, in the two-step re…nement we have proposed, Hell should also be a sparsely populated place: that is, in practice, societies in which opportunities are limited to a tiny elite should be frowned upon. These partially egalitarian conclusions look stronger when one considers that they are obtained without any reference to issues of 'talent' or 'responsibility': the conclusions are partial but unconditional. 24 One feature of our analysis is that in the 'Maximise the probability of Heaven' interpretation of the Nash criterion we have treated individuals as independent experiments. Note …rst that this relates only to the interpretation and not to the results themselves: the Nash criterion continues to follow from the axioms even without independence. Secondly, at least to some extent, independence can be guaranteed by de…ning the notion of success in such a way as to factor out the common variables a¤ecting success across individuals. For example, the chances of attaining a high paying job for the dustman's daughter and for the doctor's son are both a¤ected by the possi-bility of an economic recession, and must therefore be partially correlated.
To obtain independence, one might de…ne a high-paying job independently for each state of nature or as an average across states. Thirdly, it seems nevertheless of interest to consider a framework in which the input of the analysis is the probability distribution over all logically conceivable pro…les of success and failure, so as to include explicitly possible correlations, instead of social preferences over pro…les of 'marginal' distributions. This would be appropriate in cases where the correlation device is a relevant variable under the control of the social decision maker -imagine for instance the decision whether two o¢cials on a wartime mission should travel on the same plane or on separate planes (with each plane having a probability p of crashing). Correlations are at the core of Fleurbaey's [15] study of risky social situations, which characterises a (mild) form of ex-post egalitarianism, allowing individual outcomes to be measured along a utility scale, for a …xed and strictly positive vector of probabilities on a given set of states of the world. An interesting development of our research would be to study the issue of correlations in our framework, with variable probabilities and a restricted range of outcomes. implies that 8 2 (0; 1) : a = a + (1 ) a 00 S b = b + (1 ) b 00 . Note that a j = a 0 j = a 00 j and b j = b 0 j = b 00 j all j 6 = t, and a t = a t + (1 ) a 00 t = [ + (1 ) 0 ] a t and b t = [ + (1 ) 0 ] b t . Hence, given that 0 > > 1, there is 2 (0; 1) : [ + (1 ) 0 ] = and therefore a = a 0 and b = b 0 , yielding a contradiction (note that the case b 00 t = b 0 t = b t = 0 makes no di¤erence to the argument).
A similar reasoning rules out a 0 S b 0 if < 1 (the case = 1 is obvious). 2. Next, suppose that 1 > b 0 t > a 0 t but, contrary to the statement, b 0 < S a 0 . Suppose …rst that b 0 S a 0 . Then, consider a 00 ; b 00 formed from a 0 ; b 0 2 B T as follows: a 00 t = 0 a t ; b 00 t = 0 b t ; a 00 j = a j ; b 00 j = b j all j 6 = t; and 0 = 1 . In other words, a 00 = a, b 00 = b (and so a 00 ; b 00 2 B T ) and since a 0 t < b 0 t , it must be a 00 t < b 00 t . Since 0 = 1 > 0 it follows by Probabilistic Non-Interference that b 00 < S a 00 , and since a 00 = a, b 00 = b the desired contradiction ensues.
Next, assume that b 0 S a 0 . Let > 1. Then consider a 00 ; b 00 2 B T formed from a; b 2 B T as follows: a 00 t = 0 a t ; b 00 t = 0 b t ; a 00 j = a j all j 6 = t; b 00 j = b j all j 6 = t, and 0 > . Thus, b 00 t > b 0 t and a 00 t a 0 t , with equality holding if and only if a 00 t = a 0 t = a t = 0 (the existence of a 00 ; b 00 2 B T is guaranteed by the assumption 1 > b 0 t > a 0 t ). The previous argument implies that a 00 < S b 00 . But then Individual Sure Thing implies that 8 2 (0; 1) : a = a + (1 ) a 00 S b = b + (1 ) b 00 . Note that a j = a 0 j = a 00 j and b j = b 0 j = b 00 j all j 6 = t, and a t = a t + (1 ) a 00
Hence, given that 0 > > 1, there is 2 (0; 1) : [ + (1 ) 0 ] = and therefore a = a 0 and b = b 0 , yielding a contradiction (note again that the case a 00 t = a 0 t = a t = 0 makes no di¤erence to the argument).
A similar reasoning rules out a 0 S b 0 if < 1 (the case = 1 is obvious).
Proof of Lemma 5: For any a; b 2 B T , suppose without loss of generality that T > z = jP b j jP a j, and denote h = jP b j jP a j. We proceed by induction on h.
1. (h = 0) Consider a; b 2 B T and suppose that T > jP a j = jP b j = z. If z = 0, then the result follows by re ‡exivity. If z > 0 and there is a permutation such that a = b, the result follows by Anonymity. Therefore suppose that z > 0 and there is no permutation such that a = b. In contradiction with the statement, suppose that a S b. By completeness, and without loss of generality, suppose that a S b. By Anonymity we can focus on the ranked vectors a; b where by assumption: and z = T l + 1. Take any k such that a k 6 = b k . Consider a vector a which is a permutation of a such that a 1 = a k , a k = a 1 = 0, and all other entries are the same. By Anonymity and transitivity, a S b.
If a k > b k , consider the vectors a 0 ; b 0 2 B T obtained from a ; b as follows: with l > l h > 1. Then consider the vector a 0 which is obtained from a by setting 1 > a 0 l 1 > 0: a 0 = 0; 0; :::; 0; a 0 l 1 ; a l ; :::; a T . By construction jP b j jP a 0 j = h 1 and thus by the induction hypothesis, it must be a 0 S b. Then, by Individual Sure Thing, it follows that a 00 = a + (1 ) a 0 S b = b + (1 ) b, for all 2 (0; 1). However, since jP b j jP a 00 j = h 1 it must be a 00 S b, a contradiction.
A similar argument rules out the possibility that b S a.
Proof of Lemma 6: 1. Consider any a; b 2 B T such that a > b. Let U a;b ft 2 N : a t > b t g. Let E a;b ft 2 N : a t = b t g with cardinality E a;b . By assumption E a;b < T: We proceed by induction on E a;b = n. Since < N is complete for comparisons between pro…les with the same tail, it follows that 1 a N 1 b. Then, let 1 a 0 ; 1 b 0 2 B 1 be such that for some t 0 2 N, and some > 0,
for all > 0. Therefore 1 a 0 N 1 b 0 , and since < N < S , it follows that 1 b 0 S 1 a 0 . To prove that < S satis…es Individual Sure Thing , take any 1 a;
T , a 0 j = a j and b 0 j = b j , all j 6 = t 0 , and 1 a 0 < S 1 b 0 . Since < N is complete for comparisons between pro…les with the same tail, it follows that 1 a < N 1 b and 1 a 0 < N 1 b 0 . We show that
with 1 a 00 S 1 b 00 if at least one of the two preferences in the premise is strict.
And a similar argument holds for 1 a 0 < N 1 b 0 . By assumption it must be
T t=1 b 0 t . Furthermore, by construction, a 00 j = a j = a 0 j and b 00 j = b 0 j = b j , all j 6 = t 0 , a 00 t 0 = a t 0 + (1 ) a 0 t 0 , and b 00 t 0 = b t 0 + (1 ) b 0 t 0 . Therefore for all T b T , the following holds:
Q T t=1 a 00 t = ( a t 0 + (1 ) a 0 t 0 ) Q t6 =t 0 a t , and noting that Q t6 =t 0 a t = Q t6 =t 0 a 0 t , Q T t=1 a 00 t = Q T t=1 a t + (1 ) Q T t=1 a 0 t . A similar argument shows that
In the former case, 1 a 00 N 1 b 00 , whereas in the latter case 1 a 00 N 1 b 00 . Since < N < S , the desired result follows. If a e T = b e T = 0 for some e T > b T , then 8T e T : Q T t=1 a t = Q T t=1 b t = Q T t=1 a 0 t = Q T t=1 b 0 t = 0, and so 8T e T : Q T t=1 a 00 t = Q T t=1 b 00 t = 0. This implies 1 a 00 N 1 b 00 and the desired result again follows from < N < S . (() Suppose that < S on B 1 satis…es Finite Anonymity, Monotonicity, Restricted Dominance, Probabilistic Non-Interference , Indi-vidual Sure Thing , Weak Consistency, and Minimal Completeness. We show that < N < S , that is, for all 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 ,
and
Consider (2). Take any 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 such that 9T 2 N such that 8T
T : Q T t=1 a t > Q T t=1 b t . Take any T T and consider the pro…les ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) and ( 1 b T ; T +1 1). Clearly, ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) and ( 1 b T ; T +1 1) are in B 1 and ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) N ( 1 b T ; T +1 1). We show that ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) < S ( 1 b T ; T +1 1). Assume, to the contrary, that ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) 6 < S ( 1 b T ; T +1 1). Minimal Completeness implies that ( 1 b T ; T +1 1) S ( 1 a T ; T +1 1). Let 1 x ( 1 b T ; T +1 1) and 1 y ( 1 a T ; T +1 1), so that 1 x S 1 y. With a straightforward modi…cation of the argument in the proof of Theorem 7, we can use Probabilistic Non-Interference , Individual Sure Thing , Finite Anonymity, Minimal Completeness, and transitivity iteratively to derive vectors 1 y m = ( 1 y m T ; T +1 1), 1 x m = ( 1 x m T ; T +1 1) such that 1 y m T > 1 x m T and 1 x m S 1 y m . However, by Monotonicity, we have 1 y m < S 1 x m , a contradiction. We conclude that 1 y ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) < S 1 x ( 1 b T ; T +1 1).
We need to show that 1 y S 1 x. Suppose to the contrary that 1 y S 1 x. Note that Q T t=1 a t > Q T t=1 b t implies that 1 a T 0. Then there is a su¢ciently small number " > 0 such that 1 a " T = (a 1 "; a 2 "; :::; a T ") 0 and Q T t=1 (a t ") > Q T t=1 b t . By Lemma 14, 1 y S 1 y ( 1 a " T ; T +1 1) and therefore transitivity implies 1 x S 1 y . Then the above reasoning can be applied to 1 x and 1 y to prove that 1 y < S 1 x which yields the desired contradiction.
Since ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) S ( 1 b T ; T +1 1) for any T T , it follows from Weak Consistency that 1 a S 1 b. Consider (3). Take any 1 a; 1 b 2 B 1 such that 9T 2 N such that 8T T : Q T t=1 a t = Q T t=1 b t . Case 1. 1 a 0 and 1 b 0. If 9T 2 N such that 8T T : Q T t=1 a t = Q T t=1 b t , then e T +1 a = e T +1 b. Suppose, in contradiction, that 1 a S 1 b. By Minimal Completeness, and without loss of generality, suppose that 1 a S 1 b. Fix T T . With an argument analogous to the …nite case, we can use Probabilistic Non-Interference , Individual Sure Thing , Finite Anonymity, Minimal Completeness, and transitivity iteratively to derive vectors 1 a m ; 1 b m 2 B 1 such that 1 a m = ( 1 a m T ; T +1 a) S 1 b m = ( 1 b m T ; T +1 b), but there is a permutation 2 such that 1 a m = ( 1 b m ), which contradicts Finite Anonymity.
Case 2. a T 0 = 0 for some T 0 2 N and b T 00 = 0 for some T 00 2 N. Take any T max fT 0 ; T 00 g and consider the pro…les ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) and ( 1 b T ; T +1 1). Clearly, ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) and ( 1 b T ; T +1 1) are in B 1 and by Lemma 13 ( 1 a T ; T +1 1) S ( 1 b T ; T +1 1). Hence, by Weak Consistency we conclude that 1 a S 1 b.
Proof of Theorem 16: ()) We …rst prove that the relations < 2N T and To prove the former set inclusion, suppose that 1 a < 2N T 1 b: By de…nition,
In either case, it is immediate to prove that 1 a < 2N
T +1 1 b and T +2 a T +2 b, and so 1 a < 2N T +1 1 b: To prove the latter set inclusion, suppose that 1 a 2N T 1 b. By de…nition at least one of the following statements is true:
(i) 1 a T
2N
F 1 b T and T +1 a T +1 b (ii) 1 a T < 2N F 1 b T and T +1 a > T +1 b. If (i) holds, then it is immediate to prove that 1 a T +1 2N F 1 b T +1 and T +2 a T +2 b and so 1 a 2N T +1 1 b. So, suppose (ii) holds but (i) does not. If a T +1 = b T +1 , then 1 a T < 2N F 1 b T and T +1 a > T +1 b implies 1 a T +1 < 2N F 1 b T +1 and T +2 a > T +2 b. If a T +1 > b T +1 , then 1 a T < 2N F 1 b T and T +1 a > T +1 b implies 1 a T +1 2N F 1 b T +1 and T +2 a T +2 b. In either case 1 a 2N T +1 1 b. In sum, we have proved that < 2N
